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Agamben’s cinema: psychology versus an ethical 
form of life  
 
by Janet Harbord 
 
What does the work of Giorgio Agamben bring to an understanding of cinema? A 
political philosopher known predominantly for the ongoing project of works that 
comprise the Homo Sacer series,1 Agamben also writes about cinema. However, 
the relationship between the political determination of his work and the essays on 
cinema is not straightforward. Unlike Jacques Rancière, Agamben does not define a 
political aesthetic of the image. In fact, in the essay ‘Notes on Gesture’ the 
cinematic image is dismissed as the medium’s coinage, replaced with the 
theoretically-compressed term of ‘gesture’. In this same text he asserts that cinema 
‘belongs essentially to the realm of ethics and politics (and not simply to that of 
aesthetics)’.2 Cautious of this move, James S. Williams enquires whether the 
category of the aesthetic is ‘always pulled back towards ethics’ and made ‘safe’ in 
Agamben’s rendition of cinema – a question that resonates with Rancière’s criticism 
of the recent ethical turn in philosophy as a profoundly nihilistic move.3 Yet in 
presenting gesture rather than the image as cinema’s ‘element’ Agamben orients 
the political stakes in a particular way, where cinema is a force-field through which 
oppositional currents pass. Within this force-field the opposition between gesture 
and the image opens onto a far more fundamental tension in which a common 
language of the (gestural) body is set against its biopolitical capture.  
 
The second key point to note about Agamben’s cinema is its elaboration of gesture 
through an archaeological method that threads connections across disciplines and 
discourses as well as times.4 Cinema in this regard is a great reserve, providing an 
archive of gestures whose task is not to service meaning as an illustration or 
representation but to reveal the body’s communicability as a dynamic force that 
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may be discharged at any point in time, and archaeological practice enables just 
that. Yet whilst gesture obtains this promissory potential, cinema at its inception 
also captures the moment at which humans have lost control of their gestures, 
manifest in a crisis of communicability. Comparing the traces of the gesticulating 
bodies of Gilles de la Tourette’s patients with those in the proto-cinematic series of 
photographs taken by Eadward Muybridge, Agamben suggests that these are the 
twin processes of a biopolitical production of life; respectively, the body as the site 
of investigation and the exemplary body put to work. Yet the ethico-political 
implications of Agamben’s essay on gesture and the biopolitical production of life 
are relatively under-developed. The aim of this article is to pursue not only cinema’s 
relation to biopolitical capture, but the way in which cinema came to compensate 
for such a reductive version of corporeality by constructing the concept of an 
individual located as complex interiority. When gestural communication declines at 
the close of the nineteenth century meaning is relocated to the internal space within 
the human body; commensurate with this production of human interiority as a site 
of truth, cinema becomes a machine whose task is to decipher the turmoil of the 
inside. Thus, cinema is part of a production of human interiority as a veiled enigma, 
simultaneously foreclosing the common communicability of the gestural body, and 
weighing in against the instrumental figuration of the body as a site of biopolitical 
investigation. 
 
The essay ‘Notes on Gesture’ is structured like a report with a series of points that 
read almost as intertitles in an early film, underscoring and interleafing the action.5 
The opening subtitle states that by the end of the nineteenth century the (Western) 
bourgeoisie had lost its gestures, followed by the second point that the cinema 
attempts to both recover and record the loss. The third point is that which redeems 
cinema in the assertion that the element of cinema is gesture and not the image – a 
hinge in the argument that turns towards potential salvation. The fourth and 
lengthiest point is this: ‘[b]ecause cinema has its center in the gesture and not in the 
image, it belongs essentially to the realm of ethics and politics (and not simply to 
that of aesthetics)’.6 The final title closes the circle by bringing politics back to 
gesture: ‘[p]olitics is the sphere of pure means, that is, of the absolute and complete 
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gesturality of human beings’.7 The essay closes on this statement with no 
elaboration beneath the subheading, as though this silent film may run on and we 
viewers must imagine the consequent scene. The simplicity of the headings 
contrasts to the complexity of thought compressed into this gnomic piece of writing 
that leads from the identification of pathology in motor coordination in the late 
nineteenth century to cinema, ethics, and politics, declining aesthetics along the 
way. How is it possible to unpack this assertion that cinema is summoned from the 
field of the image and aesthetics to take its place as a gestural medium belonging 
with ethics and politics? 
 
The image is not in itself a priority in Agamben’s work. However, as Benjamin Noys 
writes, it appears as a ‘minor’ concern in the sense given to the term by Deleuze 
and Guattari, as a continuous flight to release the image from the function of 
representation and classification.8 ‘Although the image is nowhere a sustained point 
of reference for Agamben’s work’, writes Noys, ‘his momentary reflections and 
fragmentary comments on the image attests to the necessity continually to displace 
its centrality’.9 Where the image does appear it is often associated with the spectral 
system of capital, a moniker for the captivation of human desire (and gesture) in a 
system that returns this as a reified and ultimately unattainable condition.  
 
Across his work, pornography and advertising are attributed the ambiguous role of 
‘hired mourners’ that escort the commodity image to the grave.10 Here Agamben 
draws on his friend Guy Debord and his analysis of the society of the spectacle, a 
condition that refers us not to the image itself but the way in which the image 
comes to constitute the relations between human beings, and indeed between 
humans and things. Under the sign of the spectacle the image mediates relations. It 
gets between a seductive and ultimately unattainable image of ‘life’ and separates it 
from the living being. This account is nonetheless inflected by a Benjaminian sense 
of salvation in which the image is redeemable, situated within a force-field that 
Agamben elsewhere calls a ‘zone of undecidability’, the site at which two 
possibilities for the image coincide. Here, the image may be deployed by capital to 
deaden its dynamic capacity (its call to act), or conversely it may maintain its own 
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potentiality, its capacity to release a dynamic energy that has been frozen but not 
destroyed. Out of these two elements the deadening effect of capital is described 
by Deborah Levitt as gesture expropriated by the spectacle, which silences its 
communicative capacity; ‘we could read the spectacle as an in-between of object 
(image) and invested desire (eye) that suspends the two from a state of dialogue’.11 
If the system of reification has fixed the gestural potential of the image – that is, 
made static the energy of gestural display – the image retains the possibility of 
revivification (its gestural capacity) when it is re-appropriated. This is the argument 
made by Jessica Whyte in saying that through the notion of profanation the image 
(or other commodity form) may be taken from the space of a ‘sacred’ separation 
and inserted back into common use.12 
 
Cinema as image and as gesture would seem to be situated ambivalently at the 
crossroads of capital and salvation, a position that arises from its footing in 
photography and the frozen gesture. The emergence of cinema qua cinema is 
subtly treated by Agamben in that the distinction between photography and cinema 
is not notable. Indeed, Garrett Stewart goes as far as to claim that Agamben ‘defers 
all questions of medium-specificity to the phenomenological “plane of immanence” 
(the touchstone Deleuzian formulation), where motion is visible as such’.13 If 
photographers such as Muybridge appear in Agamben’s writings (and Muybridge 
assumes a particularly prescient position) it is not as a predecessor to the cinema 
as entertainment complex but as a progenitor of the study of bodies and their 
capacities, creating a different non-chronological alliance of photography and 
cinema that is concerned with what it is a body can do. It is of course an arising of a 
biopolitical investiture in the body as the site of investigation and the seeking of 
‘truth’, as Pasi Väliaho notes, ‘a politics that is situated on and constantly 
modulates and redraws the boundaries between the bare fact of living and 
social/psychic life’.14 A prismatic figure, Muybridge turns his camera towards the 
body, many bodies, and charts their capacity to jump, throw, step, and run. He is 
not interested in portraiture (the common use for photography up until this 
moment), in who these people are or presume to be, but in the abstract and virtual 
capacity of bodies to act. He creates images that at once arrest movement and 
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capture its potency. He breaks the fluid motion of running into a series of staccato 
steps. Muybridge brings into being the still image as movement, a vector of 
transmission. 
 
The significance of the division between a cinema of gesture and a cinema of the 
image that Agamben cleaves has a further legacy through his attachment to the art 
historian Aby Warburg, whose work he studied during a period of research at the 
Warburg Institute in London in 1974.15 In ‘Notes on Gesture’, Warburg is evoked in 
the second section as a researcher whose practice and investigations into the 
image uncovered gesture as ‘a crystal of historical memory’. ‘Because of the fact 
that this research was conducted through the medium of images’, writes Agamben, 
‘it was believed that the image was also its object’.16 This is a belief that Agamben 
sets about dispelling. Warburg, through his method of collecting and tracing 
connections between thousands of images from antiquity to the twentieth century 
had, according to Agamben’s corrective, achieved a transformation of the image 
into ‘a decisively historical and dynamic element’.17 His ambitious project, the atlas 
Mnemosyne, left incomplete upon his death, comprised over a thousand 
photographs that present the gestures of Western humanity over this duration. Each 
image is less an autonomous reality, writes Agamben, than a film still – that is, each 
image is part of a larger set or paradigm that it both establishes and is established 
by.18 A film still, like a photograph, is characterised both by a mode of belonging (to 
other similar images) and by a relationship to movement.  
 
Warburg’s method of intuitive gathering and analysis of detail produces an 
iconography concerned not with an era and its subjects but rather the anomalies 
that reveal historical continuity. At the centre of Warburg’s practice was a concept 
of culture as transmission, a concept possibly influenced by anthropology at the 
turn of the twentieth century. Agamben identifies the evolutionary biologist Richard 
Semon as a critical influence on Warburg’s thought. Warburg had bought Semon’s 
book Mneme (named after the Greek goddess of memory) in 1908. In this text 
Semon proposes a theory of memory that binds memory, culture, and biological 
function. Semon proposed that every external stimulus producing an effect on the 
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body left a trace or imprint which he named an engram, and, in a thread that leads 
back to the medical investiture of de la Tourette, he argued that this potential 
memory-affect was located within the nervous system (included in his list of 
inscriptions are involuntary spasms and discharges in response to stimuli). 
Capturing this energy, the engram is a type of residue, a trace of memory encoded 
and open to future transmission across time, retaining a potential for re-activation 
within the appropriate conditions. From this, Warburg took the concept that a 
potential existed within culture to conserve energy in a gesture, whose dynamic 
force could be discharged at a later date. In addition to the animating force of the 
gesture there is something potentially explosive in the concept of the engram as 
transmission that is encoded in Agamben’s essay on gesture.  
 
When Agamben writes ‘[f]or human beings who have lost every sense of 
naturalness, each single gesture becomes a destiny’,19 he is not referring explicitly 
to Muybridge, nor de la Tourette, yet each of them experience a gesture that marks 
their destiny. In 1874, Muybridge famously travelled some 75 miles to track down 
Major Harry Larkyns, the lover of his wife and probable father of the child 
Muybridge had considered his, and shot him – a ‘gesture’ for which Muybridge was 
to become infamous.20 Agamben attributes an image sequence to Muybridge titled 
‘Running man with shotgun’, which perfectly captures the journey, the intent of the 
act, and the heat of the event – and yet no such sequence exists.21 Curiously, there 
was also a shooting incident in the life of Gilles de la Tourette that occurred some 
years after his studies of the human gait and of nervous disorders in 1893. De la 
Tourette was shot by a former patient, Rose Kamper, who claimed that she was 
hypnotised by de la Tourette against her will; Kamper appeared one day at his 
treatment center and stopped the flow of his conversation in the most startling of 
ways, but not for good. De la Tourette survived the relatively superficial head 
wound, but according to his biographer his reputation was permanently damaged in 
the suggestion of his abuse of power. In unintentional acts of transmission gesture 
may also become a destiny in which ‘life becomes indecipherable’. Agamben reads 
Muybridge and de la Tourette as documentarians of a profound shift, yet they are 
also diagnostic figures for the philosopher when he writes: ‘[i]n this phase the 
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bourgeoisie, which just a few decades earlier was still firmly in possession of its 
symbols, succumbs to interiority and gives itself up to psychology.’ 
 
One might say the same of cinema during the first decade of the twentieth century, 
as its modality transferred from one of gestural, externally-oriented cinema muto to 
a cinema of psychological drama located ‘within’ the character. It is not the case 
that cinema simply reflected a social phenomenon, but that cinema came into being 
as a properly institutionalised form through discourses of internalisation that were 
born a century earlier. If, for Foucault, subjectivity had been produced and 
stabilised through the long nineteenth century with the institutionalisation of ‘identity 
effects’ through medicine, education, criminalisation, juridico-legal discourses, and 
labour practices, such processes gave form to an emergent cinema as it too 
became regulated and standardised. The shift that cinema underwent in its twist 
from aberrant music-hall ephemera and eclecticism to psychological drama 
delivered it to the services of an individualising culture. The process runs parallel to 
what Roberto Esposito, in a discussion of Foucault’s biopolitical model, has 
designated a move from a paradigm of community (communitas) to one of 
immunisation (immunitas), or from commonality to the withdrawal of the living being 
from collective forms of life at the risk of contagion.22 While Esposito is engaged 
with Foucault’s thesis of the optimisation of life at all costs through the institutions 
of medicine, education, and law – a far cry from cinema – it is possible to find in 
cinema’s designation of a space of truth internal to the individual a related 
withdrawal from communal communicability. Cinema’s designation as a ‘mass 
culture’ betrays the potency of an instituted atomisation of the subject on the 
screen speaking to the atomised subject of the auditorium.  
 
There are many comedies in the archives of early cinema pertaining to bodies which 
are routinely subjected to accidental or intentional harm, imaged by cinema, 
according to Lisa Tehair, as ‘preposterous figurations’,23 defying the laws of the 
physical universe: crushed, flattened, dropped, broken, run over. The body almost 
always seems to get it, only to be magically rejuvenated in the course of a short 
film. However, there is an early film that reverses this story: The Big Swallow (James 
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Williamson, 1901). A man, wearing a bowler hat and carrying a cane, appears 
irritated and argumentative in response to the camera’s presence. He moves 
towards the lens in a mode that is both tentative and threatening, continuing a 
highly gestural rant. Moving into extreme proximity, his mouth covers the lens and 
he appears (for the viewer) to have swallowed the camera. At this point (shot two) 
the screen becomes as black as the inside of a mouth would be without 
illumination. The shot then becomes illuminated to reveal an imagined space, dimly 
lit, showing the cinematographer and the camera as they meet their fate and are 
swallowed. The third shot withdraws from the mouth, passing back over the teeth, 
returning to the exterior of the body to show the man chewing and swallowing, 
ending with his satisfied smile.  
 
The film is a gag, which is literally that which blocks or disenables speech. The 
camera would seem to have silenced the rattled man (played by comic actor Sam 
Dalton) and its presence is possibly the cause of his rising fury. But we are unable 
to hear what is being said, and in this respect the film capitalises on the body’s 
gestural quality, its way of communicating without speech being heard. His 
gesticulation is tic-like in the sideways movements of the head, his repetitive arm 
flailing, the manic fiddling with a pair of spectacles, and the odd contortions of his 
face. Is this figure before us a member of the bourgeoisie losing control of his 
gestures and cinema recording the loss? If so, does cinema recover the loss of 
gesture as comedy? The gag takes a somersault when cinema is ingested, done 
away with by its own power to change the scale of things. The man’s mouth on 
screen is huge, large enough to provide a tunnel into which a cameraman and his 
equipment may disappear, and so the gag rests on the turning of something 
explicitly cinematic against itself. Cinema’s capacity to transform the scale of a 
thing as image redoubles and it is the apparatus as camera that is dwarfed inside 
the space of an enlarged mouth. 
 
There is something more to be said of this act in terms of ingestion that requires us 
to question what it is that was swallowed with the emergence of cinema. This film, 
in open display, performs cinema’s movement into the interiority of the body; the 
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film is an engram that demonstrates in just over a minute the potency of cinema to 
dramatise an interest in the internal space of the body, a transmission that finds 
resonance with the multiple versions of medical imaging that are circulated today.24 
In 1901, in James Williamson’s innovative comic short, the horizon of a biopolitical 
condition is there to be seen, disguised as a gag. In Akira Lippit’s reading of this 
film he draws a similar connection to dramatised internal space with reference to 
Freud’s dream of his analysis with the patient Irma. Freud dreams of Irma’s mouth, 
its resistance to his desire to reach her subconscious, and the specter of 
formlessness that it presented. The camera’s move into the man’s mouth in The Big 
Swallow suggestively echoes ‘Freud’s X-ray entry into Irma’s mouth’, as Lippit 
writes, continuing: ‘[i]t marks the passage of the subject into the illusory body of the 
other, but also the loss of oneself elsewhere, in an other, deep inside an other.’25 
For Lippit, cinema teeters on the edge of an anatomical excursus that threatens the 
dissolution of the self. The psychotherapist may get swallowed whole too, yet there 
is something of the mechanical registration of this excursion into the interior space 
of the body that stabilises and distances the threat. Writing on Jean Martin 
Charcot’s infamous use of photography in his study (or invention) of hysteria, 
Georges Didi-Huberman offers this remark: ‘photographic endoscopy, finally able to 
unveil the most secret anatomy – as it is’.26 Photography of hysterical ‘pathology’ 
invites a performance of the ‘inside’ that translates as the interior made visible and 
legible.  
 
According to Jonathan Auerbach, the first decade of cinema (1893-1904) offers a 
prime opportunity to think questions of the body and its importance for this 
emerging technology with its probing attempts at coherence and intelligibility. He 
asks, ‘[h]ow do we read a film made at the turn of the twentieth century that has no 
clearly demarcated characters or actors, settings or plot?’ He continues: ‘[w]hat is a 
body without a comprehensible story to give it some context?’27 If one of the first 
popular British films of the early nineteenth century dramatises these questions it 
also provides the answer; in a figural way and during the following decade, the 
grammar of cinema evolves to consolidate the internal ‘world’ of characters as the 
site and anchor of intelligibility. There are various cinematic fronts that this quest to 
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secure interiority-as-truth moves forward on, including medical science films and 
popular entertainment, their efforts jointly efficacious in driving attention towards 
the join of physiognomy and psychology. Through early film experiments and figural 
instances it is possible to circle back to Agamben’s statement and find greater force 
in its assertion that ‘[i]n this phase the bourgeoisie, which just a few decades earlier 
was still firmly in possession of its symbols, succumbs to interiority and gives itself 
up to psychology’.28 However, succumbing to interiority is no facile trick; the subject 
is made to articulate the inner world to the best of her or his ability, and the couch is 
ready and waiting to facilitate the process. The speaking cure, well underway before 
cinema muto breaks out into babbling song and speech with talkies, appears intent 
on removing the gag, releasing the secrets of this interiority to flutter out like so 
many butterflies. Foucault names this psychologisation a ‘clinical codification of the 
inducement to speak’,29 part of a set of procedures that are not a repression of talk 
about sexuality but on the contrary the site of an excitable proliferation of 
discourses. 
 
The manifestation of a film grammar takes its form in correspondence with the 
pairings of speech and silence, gesture and image, bodies and their meaning, as 
they exist across numerous fields. How film in this era might be said to ‘succumb to 
interiority’ concerns the establishment of a set of production techniques that 
stabilise around the period 1910-13. The construction of space and time through 
the break-up of the tableau image, the placement of the camera within the scene 
itself and in multiple locations within the scene, and an emerging attention to 
matching the sightlines of actors collectively bring into being a grammar that 
establishes point-of-view shots, aligning the viewer with the camera. This was 
achieved in The Big Swallow, as the viewer is taken into the mouth of the irate man 
along with the camera, traversing the flat space of the tableau. In addition, there are 
early examples of reverse angle camera placements. A film made by Williamson the 
year before The Big Swallow contains a reverse angle set-up. The film, Attack on a 
China Mission (1900), showed an approach to the mission from two different angles. 
However, according to Barry Salt, it is not until 1911 that the reverse angle shot 
becomes more directly aligned with the viewer’s perspective.30 In this year Arthur 
	   12	  
Macklay’s The Loafer used reverse angle shots to stage a scene between a farmer 
and a character called simply ‘a stranger’, who approaches the farmer for money. 
The reverse angle shots play the tension of the conflict by creating opposing views. 
The 180º stage rule that began to be imposed through this technique was, as many 
film historians have described, the division of screen space into two half circles in 
which the camera could be positioned anywhere within one portion but was 
prohibited from transgressing this boundary-line.  
 
These developments successfully fragmented the tableau scene of the earliest 
films, where the fixed camera at the front of what was effectively a stage had 
created a field of vision viewed from a single, static point. In varying the camera’s 
placement the tableau was fractured, splintering into a number of images that the 
viewer was able to place psychologically within the overall scene. The relocation of 
the camera from the front of the stage into the space of the action offered the 
possibility of greater proximity to the faces of actors, focusing attention on the 
emotional register of the face. The faces of the actors could be given over to a type 
of surveillance, but this suggestion of omnipotence was overridden by the new style 
of editing that alternated close-ups: the shot-reverse shot. The increasing alignment 
of the viewer with characters (over other features of the set such as objects or 
animals) intensified the need for emotional legibility; the face became the screen 
within a screen through which ‘character’ could be read. With the move from long 
shots to medium shots to close-ups, the bodies of actors became sliced into 
segments (knee to head, waist to head, face and neck), with the close-up on the 
face the critical point of an intensification of the emotional tenor of these early films. 
Moving away from a cinema of capers (a cast of bungling characters acting on a 
stage being observed by the viewer as a simultaneous event), the new grammar 
demanded that the viewer assemble the various shots psychologically as parts of a 
whole picture, bearing in mind the order of their sequence. The further effect of 
reverse angle shots then is temporal and rhythmic, producing a chronology and 
beat through expressions that move from the face of one actor to the face of 
another.  
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However, in the lexicon of early cinema language there is a shot that retains the 
deepest degree of ambiguity in terms of its intelligibility: the close-up. It resides 
ambivalently in the codification of the body, oscillating between description and 
immersion, a celebration of surface and an aggressive desire to know the other. 
Jean Epstein magnificently rides the cusp in his writing on cinema’s magnifying 
qualities. ‘Even more beautiful than a laugh is the face preparing for it’, he writes. ‘I 
love the mouth which is about to speak and holds back, the gesture which hesitates 
between right and left, the recoil before the leap, and the moment before landing, 
the becoming, the hesitation, the taut spring, the prelude.’31 Epstein’s obeisance in 
front of the close-up permits a submission to its graphic nature, its texture, and its 
variable form. The essay also testifies to an intensive desire to be inside of the 
screen other, evident when he writes of a situation in which a character is going to 
meet another. ‘I want to go along with him not behind or in front of him or by his 
side, but in him’, he states, pressing the thought further: ‘I would like to look 
through his eyes and see his hand reach out from under me as if it were my own; 
interruptions of opaque film would imitate the blinking of our eyelids’ – as though 
film could not only facilitate the desire but combine the two bodies.32 Cinema 
presents an invitation (to Epstein at least) to go inside of another, and it is this 
interior space that forever remains an enigma.33  
 
The desire to ‘see’ inside or beneath or through is, according to Tom Gunning, 
prevalent in literature of the late nineteenth century, where the flâneur oscillates with 
the detective – the former an oneiric floating observer while the latter prevails 
through a moral framework of intense scrutiny.34 The detective, like the psychologist 
and the criminologist, needs to see through the surface of things. It is no 
coincidence that a discovery of this nature occurs in 1895, as Lisa Cartwright notes: 
‘[t]he histories of the X-ray and the cinema coincide in concrete and matter of-fact 
ways.’35  
 
When the German physicist Wilhelm Röntgen was experimenting with the path of 
electrical rays passing from an induction coil through a partially evacuated glass 
tube he noticed an uncanny effect. The tube was covered in black paper enclosing 
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the light rays and the room was blacked out, yet the rays appeared on an 
illuminated screen at one end of the room. The ‘screen’ was a small piece of card 
covered in fluorescent materials (barium platinocyanide). In further experiments he 
discovered that objects of diverse thicknesses interposed in the path of the rays 
showed varying degrees of transparency. The experiment that clinched it involved a 
body – not his but that of his wife Anna Bertha, whose hand Röntgen placed over a 
glass photographic plate. The resulting image famously showed the bone structure 
of her hand and the detail of her wedding ring, offering a perception of the body 
beneath the skin and apart from the flesh. The ‘new rays’ (as they were called) were 
produced by the impact of cathode rays on a material object, but their newness 
defied naming. Röntgen called them X-rays, drawing on the principle from 
mathematics that ‘X’ represents an unknown quantity. The paper that he wrote 
reporting the research, ‘On a New Kind of Rays’,36 was published in December 1895 
– the same month that the Lumière brothers were screening their invention at the 
Salon Indien du Grand Café in Paris. 
 
The desire for ‘seeing through’ is identified by Steven Connor as an inherent feature 
of modernism, for the modern experience (according to Connor) is of being 
permeated.37 Figuratively, these two positions of ‘permeation’ and of ‘seeing 
through’ mark the respective polar lines that converge in the subjectification of 
bodies to the many practices of observation and taxonomy throughout the 
nineteenth century. According to Connor, during the first ten years of their 
recognised existence, X-rays were considered akin to the photographic apparatus, 
requiring an alchemical process in which a transformation occurs (development) 
and delivers a revelation (the image). What the X-ray brings to the foreground is 
seeing, the act of vision caught in its own mediality: ‘X-ray vision was linked with 
photography’s power to arrest and anatomise vision, to get on the inside of seeing 
itself’, writes Connor, ‘making the invisible, the act of seeing itself, visible.’ Another 
inside opens up, the ‘inside of vision’, that through which an action can be exhibited 
in its own mediality. Seeing, far from being a naturalised operation of sight-as-
knowledge, becomes detached from the body just at the moment that the body 
becomes see-through to itself. X-rays articulated a body not exactly see-through – 
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more accurately, the term described the various dimensions and properties of the 
body as a composite of diverse and mutating matter. ‘The term artefact perhaps 
best describes the X-ray image’, writes Akira Lippit, ‘which is at once buried and 
revealed, invoking its archaeological nature as spectacle.’ He continues: ‘[t]he X-ray 
image determines a kind of living remnant, a phantom subject.’38 Despite how solid 
the bones of the X-ray appeared to Anna Bertha her exclamation ‘I have seen my 
own death!’ produces an opposite assurance: that the body (all bodies) obey the 
second law of thermodynamics (inertia and decay). In fact, as Connor writes, it is 
this ‘intermingling and reversibility of the positive and the negative, the radiating and 
the fixed, the interior and the exterior, the force and the form’ that is ‘the essential 
feature of magical thinking regarding the making visible of the invisible’. 
 
The interior of the body becomes the site of an investiture of truth and identity, but 
one to which access is obscure, requiring magic, or inventiveness at least. The 
cinema, the X-ray, the many taxonomic tests, practices, and observations are all 
driven by the same quest to unravel the enigmatic subject, which is simultaneously 
a process that inscribes as much as it discovers the enigma as an internal form. The 
language describing this investiture of the interior of the body as a locus of truth 
begins to be influenced by its own descriptions. Evolving this as metaphor; there 
are the acts of ‘seeing through’ someone or ‘getting under the skin’ of another. The 
paradox that places the subject at the centre of a biopolitical discourse as an axis 
of meaning is this: that the subject may never be the agent of discovery of her or his 
own ‘truth’. On the interplay of psychic, physical, and metaphysical discourses in 
the inventory of unseen forces (of which the X-ray is an instrument of taxonomy), 
Marina Warner writes that ‘[t]he capacity to see through solid matter did not have 
the effect of disenchanting empiricism and turning such vision mundane’. On the 
contrary, ‘doctors now seemed endowed with supernatural powers’.39 If the 
interiority of the individual rendered as graphic form appeared ghostly, the cinema 
as it became an institutionalised narrative form provided a more familiar access to 
the inside in its focus on an inner world expressed in complex form over the 
duration of an hour or more.  
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In conclusion, gesture frames the body in its communicability over and against the 
biopolitical drive to locate, examine, and fix meaning. Cinema can go either way, 
and it does, funnelling in one direction into the restricted contours of generic bodily 
forms, standardised gestures of performance, and the hallmark ‘tics’ of star 
personae produced in studios. The ‘meaning’ of film sequences is secured in their 
moment of recording and in the closure of narrative, and films in turn become dead 
letters, a correspondence with no destination. In another direction gesture inheres 
in cinematic images as a transmission, displaying a common language that exhibits 
the delight of communicability as a question, awakening the image into movement, 
as Libby Saxton argues, ‘without telos or destiny’.40  
 
Kafka, according to Benjamin, took gesture to be an act whose meaning cannot be 
known in advance, but from which the author attempts to find the meaning ‘in ever-
changing contexts and experimental groupings’.41 Kafka’s version of gesture might 
be the most potent description of cinema as it moved in other directions, avoiding 
the funnel of gestural cliché and the demand for subjective truth, flowing into bodily 
comedy, science films, education, and amateur footage among multiple modalities. 
That is, Agamben’s focus on gesture retains the potentiality of a body liberated from 
the biopolitical demand for meaning and exactitude, for bodies to be calculated, 
calibrated, and known. When gesture is allowed to inhere in a cinematic form in a 
manner that refuses exact interpretation it works against the apparatus of identity 
effects. Confronted at the beginning of the twentieth century and again at the 
beginning of the twenty-first with a generalised demand for an account of the self, 
the subject in gesture points only to the failure of such a system; gesture does not 
speak the subject but is the demonstration of its contingency. Gesture is the empty 
space of identity, a space that cannot be inhabited as a permanent or fully-
knowable phenomenon. In an essay on authorship and gesture, Agamben ends the 
text in this way:  
 
[a] subjectivity is produced where the living being, encountering language and 
putting itself into play in language without reserve, exhibits in a gesture the 
impossibility of its being reduced to this gesture. All the rest is psychology, 
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and nowhere in psychology do we encounter anything like an ethical subject, 
a form of life.42 
  
If Agamben opposes psychology (or the turn to interiority) to an ethical form of life, 
the link between the ethical and the openness of the body is elucidated in the short 
essay ‘Without classes’ in The Coming Community.43 The essay opens with the 
denouncement of the triumph of a single planetary bourgeoisie, the inheritors of the 
earlier turn-of-the-century bourgeoisie who lost gesture and lost all pathos. This 
class, within which all social classes and differences are now dissolved, is the 
triumph of a nihilistic individualism that tragically precludes any recourse to the 
common being, to community. If this humanity, instead of searching for a ‘proper 
identity’ in individuality, sought ‘a singularity without identity, a common and 
absolutely exposed singularity’, as he writes, ‘if humans could, that is, not be-thus in 
this or that biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority and their face, 
then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions 
and without subjects, into a communication without the incommunicable’.44 The 
potential of early cinema was the possible site of community, of singular 
exteriorities, faces, and contingencies being only the thus. Archaeologically 
speaking, this potential remains with cinema in the present. 
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